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Compelled Testimony with Immunity:
Applying the Standard of Use and Derivative Use
Defendants were subpoenaed to appear before a federal grand jury. Anticipating that the subpoenaed witnesses would assert the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the Government obtained an order from the

district court directing them to answer questions and produce evidence under
a grant of immunity conferred in accordance with the 1970 Immunity Act.'
Nevertheless, the defendants refused to testify on the ground that the scope
of immunity provided by the statute was not coextensive with the scope of
the privilege against self-incrimination.' The district court rejected this contention and held them in contempt of court. The court of appeals affirmed,'
and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held, affirmed: Immunity from

the use of compelled testimony and of evidence derived from the use of such
testimony in subsequent criminal proceedings is coextensive in scope with
the fifth amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. Kastigar
v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
I. THE TRADITION OF COMPELLED TESTIMONY AND
IMMUNITY LEGISLATION

The tradition of compelled testimony is deeply rooted in legal history. As
early as the thirteenth century, when witnesses were becoming an important
feature of judicial proceedings, the reluctance of the witness to testify against
his neighbor caused problems which could only be resolved by summoning
the witness to court and ordering him to testify. The Statute of Elizabeth,
enacted in 1562,' recognized the right of the courts to compel testimony and
penalized any witness who refused to testify after service of process. In the
United States, the power of the federal government to compel testimony was
'Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. 5§ 6001-05 (1970). The Act provides that a witness is compelled to testify under an order containing a grant of immunity
and issuing from a United States Attorney, with the approval of the Attorney General or
his designated assistant. Further, the witness may be compelled to testify before a U.S.
court or grand jury, an agency of the United States, or either house of Congress, joint committees of both houses or a committee or subcommittee of either.
"The scope of immunity extended only to immunity from use of information given in
the witness's testimony, or information that might be derived from the testimony. It did
not extend to grant complete immunity from prosecutions for all transactions revealed in
testimony if those transactions could be substantiated by information obtained independently
of the testimony in question. "[B)ut no testimony or other information compelled under
the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other
information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case .
Id. § 6002.
'Stewart v. United States, 440 F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1971).
4See 8 J. WIGMORE, EvIDENCE 65 (J. McNaughton ed. 1961). The early history of
compelled testimony relates to the problem which arose when witnesses would not come
and testify at trial without compulsion, and indeed, were not welcomed to do so by those
who might suffer as a result of the testimony. The concept of privilege from self-incrimination did not come into focus until the eighteenth century, with the result that compelled
testimony had then to contend more with this privilege and less with the problem of drawing the witness to trial.
' An Act for the Punyshement of Suche Persones as Shall procure or Comit any Wyllful
Perjurye, 5 Eliz. 1, c. 9, 1 6 (1562).
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first recognized in the Judiciary Act of 1789,' and was incorporated into
subsequent legislation.7
Although the power to compel testimony is firmly entrenched in legal
history, it has never been absolute. It is conditioned by the legal tradition embodied in the maxim nemo tenetur seipsum accusare-no one is bound to
accuse himself. Furthermore, the power to compel testimony has never been
construed as overriding the exemptions and privileges recognized by law,'
notably the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.' The protection of this privilege has required the passage of statutes granting the witness
immunity from punishable acts revealed in his compelled testimony. Immunity
statutes were passed in 1857,'o 1862," and 1868."2 A reenactment of the 1968
code " was found unconstitutional in Counselman v. Hitchcock. 4 In response
to Counselman, Congress formulated a new immunity act in 1893." The constitutionality of this act was upheld in Brown v. Walker, " and subsequent
immunity legislation closely followed the wording of this act. The first immunity act to depart from the pattern was passed in 1970 and is the act
challenged in the principal case.

II.

THE FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE
AND COEXTENSIVE IMMUNITY

The issue central to all those cases which have questioned the constitutionality of immunity legislation is whether the scope of immunity provided by
the statute is coextensive with the fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination. In Counselman v. Hitchcock" the Court declared the 1868
'Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 30, 1 Star. 88.
'See notes 10-12 infra.
""[TIhere is a constitutional exemption from being compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against oneself ....
"But, aside from exceptions and qualifications . . . the witness is bound not only to
attend but to tell what he knows in answer to questions framed for the purpose of bringing
out the truth of the matter under inquiry." Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281 (1919).
' "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself ....
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
"Act of Jan. 24, 1857, ch. 19, § 2, 11 Stat. 156.
"Act of Jan. 24, 1862, ch. 11, 12 Stat. 333, amending Act of Jan. 24, 1857, ch. 19,
S 2, 11 Stat. 156.
1"Act of Feb. 25, 1868, ch. 13, 5 1, 15 Star. 37.
"Act of Feb. 25, 1868, Revised Statutes, ch. 17, § 860 (1878).
1 142 U.S. 547 (1892). The grand jury of the District Court of the United States for
the Northern District of Illinois was investigating certain alleged violations of the Interstate Commerce Act of Feb. 4, 1887, by officers and agents of various railroad companies
having railroad lines in that district. Charles Counselman, engaged in the grain and commission business in Chicago, refused to answer questions concerning rates he had charged
on grain shipments, despite a grant of immunity. See notes 17-22 infra, and accompanying
text.
"Act of Feb. 11, 1893, ch. 83, 27 Stat. 443,
161 U.S. 591 (1896). Brown was subpoenaed as a witness before the grand jury
of the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Pennsylvania, to
testify regarding violations of the Interstate Commerce Act. As auditor for the railway company, Brown refused to testify regarding freight rates charged by the company. In view of
the greatly expanded immunity provisions of the 1893 immunity act, the Court upheld
the constitutionality of the act and required Brown to testify. The 1893 immunity act differed from prior acts in that it offered complete immunity from all transactions mentioned
in compelled testimony.
1"142 US. 547 (1892).
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immunity statute unconstitutional because the scope of protection offered by
the statute was not coextensive with the privilege against self-incrimination
granted by the Constitution. The protection offered by the immunity statute
did not prevent conviction of the witness by use of new evidence, even though
such evidence was found through the use of evidence given in compelled testimony."9 The Court stated that, "[iln view of the constitutional provision, a
statutory enactment, to be valid, must afford absolute immunity against
future prosecution for the offense to which the question relates."' 9 This
pronouncement set a new standard for immunity legislation. In 1893 an
immunity act was passed which had been formulated according to the standard
enunciated in Counselman. The act provided complete immunity from any
"1penalty... on account of any transaction, matter or thing, concerning which
he [the witness] may testify, or produce evidence .
"..."'
Deciding that there
was no right to remain silent by virtue of the fifth amendment privilege, the
Court in Brown v. Walker upheld the constitutionality of the act." The standard
of immunity established in Counselman and upheld in Brown has been followed, almost without exception, in subsequent state and federal cases."
In a more recent case, Ullmann v. United States,' the defendant challenged
an immunity act enacted in 1954."4 Ullmann claimed that the act did not offer
him protection against non-criminal sanctions. The act, it was contended, provided no immunity from sanctions such as "loss of job, expulsion from labor
unions, state registration and investigation statutes, passport eligibility, and
" Id.at 564.

' Id. at 586. Although this pronouncement could be considered dictum, because the
Court had already held the act in question unconstitutional, it became the test used for
future immunity legislation prior to the decision in Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378
U.S. 52 (1964). See notes 27-29 infra.
'"Act of Feb. 11, 1893, ch. 83, 27 Stat. 443.
1 "Every good citizen is bound to aid in the enforcement of the law, and has no right
to permit himself, under the pretext of shielding his own good name, to be made the tool
of others, who are desirous of seeking shelter behind his privilege." 161 U.S. 591, 600
(1896).
"See Annot., 53 A.L.R.2d 1030 (1957); Annot., 118 A.L.R. 602 (1939). See also
Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70 (1965) (Counselman standard
of complete immunity upheld in protecting petitioner from registration requirements of
Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 50 U.SC. S 783 (a) (1970)); Adams v. Maryland,
347 U.S. 179 (1953) (upholding the standard of complete immunity, in accord with the
decision in Counselman, with reference to a congressional immunity act, Act of June 25,
1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 833); United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950) (witness may
remain silent when complete immunity is not offered in return for his testimony); Smith
v. United States, 337 U.S. 137 (1949) (petitioner's immunity from prosecution on facts
concerning which he was compelled to testify was not waived by subsequent "voluntary
statement"); Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944) (use in federal court of
testimony, compelled under a state immunity statute, is not forbidden if no federal officers
participated in state proceedings; dissent cited Counselman); cf. Gardner v. Broderick, 392
U.S. 273 (1968) (applies standard of use and derivative use immunity, but cites Counselman
regarding grand jury investigation of petitioner's official duties as policeman). See also
Sarno v. Illinois Crime Comm'n, 406 U.S. 482 (1972); Zicarelli v. New Jersey Investigation Comm'n, 406 U.S. 472 (1972), both upholding the Kastigar decision.
23350 U.S. 422 (1956). Petitioner Ullman was called before a grand jury which was
investigating attempts to endanger the national security by espionage and conspiracy to commit espionage. Ullmann refused to answer questions regarding his knowledge of and activities in the Communist Party, and the participation of others in that party. Although the
Court affirmed the sufficiency of the grant of immunity from prosecution for any matters
related in testimony, it did not approve the extension of immunity beyond criminal prosecution to include noncriminal penalties.
"Immunity Act of 1954, ch. 769, S 1, 68 Star. 745.
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general public opprobrium . 2.2..""
The Supreme Court, upholding the Counselman standard, ruled that the protection offered by the statute fulfilled the
guarantees of the fifth amendment and need not extend to penalties of a nonM
criminal nature."
The first significant diversion from the standard of immunity established in
Counselman occurred in Murphy v. Waterfront Cornm'n,7 in which the Court
held that immunity was coextensive with the fifth amendment privilege if it
prohibited both the use of compelled testimony and the use, in subsequent
prosecutions, of evidence derived from compelled testimony. In Murphy the
petitioners refused to answer questions, though granted immunity under state
laws, because they felt they could be incriminated under federal laws. The
Court's ruling proscribed the use of the testimony and its fruits in federal
prosecution where a witness was compelled to testify under state immunity
statutes. In summarizing its holding in Murphy, the Court concluded, "we
hold the constitutional rule to be that a state witness may not be compelled
to give testimony which may be incriminating under federal law unless the
compelled testimony and its fruits cannot be used in any manner by federal
officials in connection with a criminal prosecution against him. '' "M
The difference between the Murphy standard and the Counselman standard
is significant. The standard in Counselman required that the witness be provided complete and absolute immunity from future prosecution for any criminal
act revealed in compelled testimony. Such immunity, termed "transactional
immunity," allowed "full immunity from prosecution for the offense to which
the compelled testimony relates .... "" The standard established in Murphy
was considerably less broad. That standard provided immunity only from
prosecution which was based on the use or derivative use of compelled testimony. By the Counselmnan standard, even subsequent evidence from totally
unrelated sources could not be used to prosecute a witness for a transaction
revealed in the compelled testimony; the witness was totally immunized. By
the Murphy standard, a witness could be prosecuted for criminal acts revealed
in his testimony so long as the evidence used was not derived directly or indirectly, from the compelled testimony.
U.S. at 430.
22Non-criminal penalties imposed by society upon a witness after compelled testimony
represent a strong argument against immunity legislation. See Wendel, Compulsory Immunity Legislation and the Fifth Amendment Privilege: New Developments and New Confusion, 10 ST. LouIs U.L. REV. 327, 353 (1966).
2 378 U.S. 52
(1964). The Court decided that a state witness may not be compelled
to testify unless such testimony and its fruits cannot be used in connection with a federal
prosecution against him. This issue involves interjurisdictional problems with respect to
grants of immunity. See Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371 (1958); Feldman v. United
States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944); United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931); Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906); Ballmann v. Fagin, 200 U.S. 186 (1906); Jack v. Kansas,
199 U.S. 372 (1905); all of which are altered or overruled by the Murphy decision. The
surprising aspect of the Murphy decision, however, is the Court's adoption of the use and
derivative use standard, rather than the standard of Counselman. This was unprecedented.
The reasoning behind adopting the new standard is suggested in Justice White's concurring
opinion in which he notes that the Counselman standard "clearly has no validity, and by
its own terms, no applicability, where the inquiry does not concern any federal offense, no
less a particular one, and the government seeking the testimony has no purpose or authority
to prosecute for federal crimes." 378 U.S. at 106.
11 ld. at 79.
1 406 U.S. at 453.
2350
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III.

KASTIGAR V. UNITED STATES

The constitutionality of immunity statutes seems well defined by Counselman, Ullmann, and Murphy., Counselman stands for the broad proposition
that, for an immunity statute to be constitutional, it must insure complete
immunity from any prosecution relating to matters revealed in the compelled
testimony. Ullmann upheld this standard, but, unlike Counselman, made mention that immunity did not extend to penalties of a noncriminal nature. And
finally, Murphy held that immunity, to be coextensive with the fifth amendment privilege, need extend only to use or derivative use of compelled testimony in subsequent prosecution.
In Kastigar the Supreme Court of the United States upheld the Murphy
standard, applying it to the new 1970 immunity act. It held that complete
transactional immunity was unnecessarily broader than the fifth amendment
privilege and that the Murphy use and derivative use standard was coextensive
with the fifth amendment privilege. In the context of the development of
immunity acts, the Kastigar decision added little to what Murphy had already
settled. As it stands, Kastigar upholds the constitutionality of the 1970 immunity act, formulated in consideration of the Murphy ruling. Kastigar also
affirms the tradition of compelled testimony and underscores the importance
of this valuable procedure in criminal proceedings.
A. The Reasoning of Kastigar
The Court's ruling in Kastigar was prefaced by establishing the importance
of compulsory testimony in government proceedings. Justice Powell, in delivering the opinion of the Court, cited Murphy: "Among the necessary and
most important of the powers of the States as well as the Federal Government
to assure the effective functioning of government in an ordered society is the
broad power to compel residents to testify in court or before grand juries or
agencies . .

.

. Such testimony constitutes one of the Government's primary

sources of information."' Implicit was the argument that, because the governmental need to compel testimony is frequently important, it should not be
limited except to protect the privileges and exemptions as derived primarily
from the fifth amendment: "There are a number of exemptions from the
testimonial duty, the most important of which is the Fifth Amendment privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination."'" With regard to the limitation of its
consideration of privileges to those arising from the fifth amendment, the
Court stated that the fifth amendment in no way prohibits Congress from enacting laws which compel self-incrimination."
Consideration was given to the contention that complete transactional
immunity must be the basis for any immunity act. Clearly the 1970 statute
did not provide complete transactional immunity; but the Court said that the
1970 statute was drafted to meet "what Congress judged to be the conceptual
basis of Counselman,"" or, more exactly, the conceptual basis of Counselman
U.S. at 93-94.
U.S. at 444.
32Id. at 448.
''Id. at 452 (emphasis added).
30378
31406

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

(Vol. 27

as construed by Murphy. The Court noted that the Counselman statute was
ruled unconstitutional because it did not "prohibit the use against the immunized witness of evidence derived from his compelled testimony."'" The
broad language in Counselman, requiring full transactional immunity, "was
unnecessary to the Court's decision [in Counselmanl, and cannot be considered
binding authority."'" As a result, the Court upheld the use and derivative use
standard as completely fulfilling the conceptual basis of Counselman. Unfortunately, in upholding the Murphy use and derivative use standard, the
Court in Kastigar was not concerned about the factual distinction between
Kastigar and Murphy. Murphy dealt with the protection provided by state
immunity laws against possible federal prosecution of a witness compelled to
testify under state immunity statutes. The Murphy Court specifically applied
the standard of use and derivative use immunity to federal inquiry into matters
revealed in state testimony under state immunity statutes." Although in
Kastigar there were no interjurisdictional, federal-state problems, the Kastigar
Court apparently saw the Murphy standard as useful in the approach to federal
immunity legislation. Perhaps the Court tacitly assumed that the standards of
immunity should be the same, whether state, federal, or interjurisdictional
proceedings were involved.
The Court made an attempt, in Kastigar,to justify the limited approach to
immunity privileges. The Court noted that immunity from use and derivative
use of compelled testimony was a "very substantial protection."" It compared
compelled testimony to coerced confessions, the latter being inadmissible at
trial, but not barring prosecution. " While a defendant making a coerced confession claim must prove that the information in question was not volunteered,
a defendant testifying under an immunity statute need only claim that prosecution is based on compelled testimony to shift the burden to the government to
prove otherwise. It is evidently in such a comparison that the conclusion that
the standard is a "substantial protection" is found.
B. The Effect of Kastigar
Since the enactment of the 1954 immunity act and the Ullmann decision,
much comment has appeared concerning immunity laws. " Kastigar, insofar as
it upholds the traditional thinking in the matter of compelled testimony with
immunity, is not likely to effect a slowdown of critical comment. Some of the
problems remaining are discussed in Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion in
Kastigar.He suggested that the Murphy standard was not relevant to Kastigar
in that there was not an interjurisdictional problem,4' which was an important
3

4 Id.

at 454.
Id. at 455.

2,378 U.S. at 79.

3'406 U.S. at 461.
38

Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).

"'See generally Soebel, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination "Federalized," 31
BROOKLYN L. REV. 1 (1964); Wendel, supra note 26; Comment, Federalism and the
Fifth: Configurations of Grants of Immunity, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 561 (1965); Comment,
The Federal Witness immunity Acts in Theory and Practice: Treading the Constitutional
Tightrope, 72 YALE L.J. 1568 (1963).
40406 U.S. at 464.
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consideration in Murphy.4 Therefore, the Justice implied, Murphy should not
have formed the basis for the Kastigar ruling. Particularly pertinent to the
understanding of Justice Douglas' criticism of the majority opinion is his dissent
in Ullmann in which he discussed the "mischief" in immunity legislation:'
the risk, not only of conviction but of prosecution; the violation of the guarantee against self-incrimination, which is a safeguard of "conscience and human
dignity and freedom of expression"' as well as a protection against conviction
and prosecution; and finally, violation of the right of silence." Such criticisms
challenge the apparent rationality of the Kastigar decision. Justice Marshall,
in a separate dissent,' pointed out impractical aspects of the Kastigar holding,
such as the difficulty of proving that evidence used in subsequent criminal
proceedings was not derived from the compelled testimony.
Kastigar has clearly established the standard for federal immunity statutes
coextensive with the fifth amendment privilege. However inapplicable the
holding of Murphy is to the factual situation in Kastigar, the Court has set
the Murphy standard as binding law with respect to federal immunity statutes
and purely federal inquiry into federal matters.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Whereas previously, complete transactional immunity was held to be the
only proper assurance to the witness that his fifth amendment privilege would
not be violated, the standard has now become one of immunity from use or
derivative use of compelled testimony only. The problem of coextensive immunity will certainly come into question again when an actual case arises in
which a witness is convicted for offenses revealed in compelled testimony.
Merely because such offenses were related in testimony given under a grant
of immunity would raise a strong presumption against subsequent attempts
to convict. In this regard, the grants of immunity issued in proceedings before
the Senate subcommittee hearings on the Watergate scandals may possibly
prove to be a fertile testing ground for the Kastigar standard of use and derivative use immunity. If it becomes difficult or impossible to prove that
subsequent convictions of Watergate defendants were not based on testimony
obtained under grants of immunity, the result may be a return to the standard
of complete transactional immunity, first outlined in Counselman. While Kastigar has ostensibly established the use and derivative use standard, perhaps
41 It is not clear that the Court in Murphy, dealing with federal-state immunity issues,
was applying the use and derivative use standard to purely federal inquiry into federal matters where there would be no interjurisdictional, federal-state problems. Justice White, in
his concurring opinion in Murphy, suggested that there may possibly be a dual standard.
See note 27 supra. If Counselman has no application to nonfederal offenses, as White indicates, there must be another standard which does. This dilemma is not resolved in White's
opinion.
42Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 440 (1956)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
Justice Douglas referred to Justice Blatchford's wording in Counselman: "[t~he [immunity]
privilege is limited to criminal matters, but it is as broad as the mischief which it seeks to
guard." 142 U.S. at 551.
43 350 U.S. at 445.
"See Comment, Federalism and the Fifth: Configurations of Grants of Immunity, 12
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 561, 564-65 nn.16, 17 (1965).
'1 406 U.S. at 467.

